29 Nov 44

The 500th Bomb Group, and especially the 881st Squadron, had not given up on the Irvin crew, which had Ditched on the 27th. Today the McNamer crew flew their first mission from Saipan, and it was a search mission for Irvin. Capt Arthur S. Miller, Squadron Navigator, went along. The plane they flew is not recorded, but they took off at 0955 and returned seven hours later at 1655, unfortunately with no success.

This morning the Fitzgerald crew flew Z-1 back to Saipan from Guam. Copilot Bob Copeland got to do the flying and make the landing. Copeland noted the presence of some battleships in Tanapag Harbor.

With their planes back from Guam, the 500th Bomb Group could prepare for their next mission, which would be tonight. The 73rd Bomb Wing was trying something new -- night radar bombing. Target would be the “light industrial portion” of Tokyo.

Nine aircraft were scheduled for this mission, but Z-28, Gerwick crew, could not get her #3 engine to pull to takeoff power (the problem was later found to be a burnt out amplifier fuse), and Z-45, McClanahan crew, burned out a bomb bay motor while prepping for take-off, so only seven planes got off:

Z-5, “There'll Always Be A Christmas”, Curtis

Z-23, “Ramblin Roscoe”, Hays/Brannock

Z-25, “American Beauty”, Savage

Z-41, Ashley

Z-44, Hansen

Z-49, “Three Feathers”, Feathers

Z-50, “Fancy Detail”, Setterich

Take-off was at twilight, between 1810 and 1828 local. Bomb load for most planes was 3 x T4E4 fragmentation clusters and 17 x M18 incendiary clusters. Z-41 carried 2 x T4E4's and 18 x M18's, and Z-49 carried 3 x T4E4's and 15 x M18's.

There was no formation; each plane flew to the target and bombed individually. The briefed route was apparently generally from the east across the Chiba Peninsula. Three radar AP's (Aiming Points) had been designated along the route to the target, and these worked very well to keep the planes on course for those planes which had working radars. Unfortunately, that was only two of them.

This mission was not an auspicious beginning for night radar bombing. The radars failed on four of the six aircraft for which there is a report. This left those planes to bomb on dead reckoning as calculated by the navigator… and dead reckoning is notoriously inaccurate.

Curiously, the possibility of radar failure had been covered in the mission briefing, but not at all realistically.

According to the Consolidated Mission Report Summary, “if the radar equipment was inoperative in any aircraft that aircraft was directed to fly on the wing of any aircraft whose radar equipment was operative and drop on that aircraft.” How you would go about finding another plane on a dark, cloudy night after flying to the target individually is not explained. Moreover, trying to fly in formation in such conditions was downright dangerous.

Six of the seven 500th aircraft are known to have reached and bombed the target, dropping between 0118 and 0147 from various altitudes (17,500-33,200 feet). Z-23 and Z-49 were the two planes which successfully bombed by radar, while Z-5, Z-25, Z-41 and Z-50, with inoperative radars, dropped their bombs by dead reckoning. Due to darkness and cloud cover, no observation of bombing accuracy was possible.

Flak was very light on this mission, and there was minimal fighter opposition. Z-49 was the only plane that reported a fighter attack, and it was ineffective.

Exit from the target area was down Tokyo Bay, past Yokohama and Yokosuka and out thru the Uraga Channel.

2/Lt Harold Towner, bombardier on the Hays crew, had high praise for the skill of their navigator, 2/Lt Wilbur Weksler, who “navigated with pinpoint accuracy to Tokyo, bombed the city by Radar and navigated back to Saipan – 13 hours of man-killing toil. We had a beautiful radar run and feel sure all our bombs fell within the target area.” This was all accomplished under the approving eye of Squadron CO Lt Col Brannock, who flew with the Hays crew as copilot on this mission.

One airplane, Z-44, Hansen crew, failed to return from this mission. The plane and crew were not seen or heard from after take-off. Since there were no Japanese claims of shooting down this aircraft and no wreckage has ever been found on land, it is almost certain that Z-44 went down at sea, probably due to a mechanical problem of some sort, somewhere in the long 1500 miles between Saipan and Japan.

The members of this crew were:

AC Maj Harold M. Hansen

P 2/Lt Robert T. Battell

B 1/Lt Kenneth F. Hodson

N 1/Lt Charles Van Amburgh

FE 1/Lt Eugene B. Reynolds

Radio T/Sgt Martin V. Taylor

Ring G Sgt Paul E. Bussell

RG T/Sgt George W. Hunt

LG Sgt Lawrence E. Lindgram

Radar Sgt Thomas J. Burns

TG Cpl Donald P. Flynn

In addition, 1/Lt Paul Steger of the 11th Combat Camera Unit was along as an observer.

The returning aircraft landed at Isley Field between 0630 and 0819 on 30 Nov.

The Group Radar Officer extensively reviewed the radar failures in his mission report. He wrote that, “Of the four systems that were inoperative two were known to be weak before take-off. The decision was made however, to send these planes and to have them use the emergency procedure in the event of failure of the system.” He didn't clarify what he meant by “emergency procedure”. Did that mean trying to bomb on another B-29's wing – if you could miraculously find one – or did it mean bombing by dead reckoning? Another inoperative set was found to have “a bent fuse holder in the range unit.” No problems could be found in the last set. It worked just fine on the ground on Saipan. Of course, it might not at 20,000 feet over Japan. Or maybe there was operator error.

A less detailed section report was submitted by now Acting Group Gunnery Officer 1/Lt Frank A. Carrico. The

regular Group Gunnery Officer, Capt Leroy English, had for some reason still not arrived from the States, and whoever had been temporarily carrying out English's duties had apparently been suddenly hospitalized, so Carrico had been thrown into the breach. Carrico wrote an abbreviated report in his usual direct, no-nonsense style and added the following explanation: “[This] Group Gunnery Officer's Report is limited due to the fact that no one was present [to conduct] a gunnery interrogation. … The previous gunnery officer was in the hospital and I was not assigned as yet, therefore the gunners did not receive thorough interrogation. A new system has been put into effect.”

Even though this mission with a total of only 24 B-29's bombing the primary was not considered very effective by XXI Bomber Command, the Japanese were impressed by it. A post-war monograph prepared for the US Office of the Chief of Military History and based on interrogations and interviews of former Japanese military personnel had this to say:

“On 30 November 1944, when B-29's made the first night raid on Tokyo and started fires in the Kanda district, the attack was not only carried out at night but also in bad weather. The 10th Air Division commander and his staff became greatly concerned because the Division was unable to take any defensive action due to the double handicap of bad weather and darkness. While the 10th Air Division, unable to operate under the adverse conditions, stood helplessly by, the enemy clearly demonstrated its superior equipment, training and coordination.”

Martin V Taylor