Sawyer Cemetery, Plymouth, Maine.

My name is Andrew J. Hudson. I served with Sergeant Skidgel for several months before he was killed in action about 1:00pm on Sunday, September 14, 1969.

Nearly thirty years have passed but this reflection is offered from my memory about his unit, his work and some of the things he was involved in the last two days of his life. He was not alone, he was among a close brotherhood of combat soldiers who cared about him and who remember him and his bravery.

Sergeant Skidgel was a Scout Leader in the 3d platoon, Troop D, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division. His platoon leader was Lieutenant Marion "Buck" Ross, who hailed from Mississippi. I was the Troop Commander.

The Troop consisted of three cavalry platoons: 1st platoon was known as "Red", 2d platoon was "White", and 3d platoon was "Blue".

The senior leadership of each platoon consisted of a Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant. Each of these leaders had a jeep with driver/radio-telephone-operator (RTO), and usually a combat medic rode with the platoon sergeants.

Each platoon had a Scout Section, an Infantry Squad, a Mortar Squad and an Anti-Tank Section.

The Scout Section consisted of two Scout Squads. A Scout Squad consisted of two M151 jeeps; each with a pedestal mounted M60 machine gun. In each scout jeep was a three-man crew: a Sergeant who was the squad leader/vehicle commander, a machine gunner/observer, and a driver/RTO/assistant machine gunner.

The Infantry Squad had a Sergeant as squad leader and nine infantrymen who were mounted in a three-quarter ton truck.

The Mortar Squad had a Sergeant as squad leader and three indirect-fire crewmen who were mounted in a three-quarter ton truck with an 81mm mortar and various types of mortar ammunition.

The Anti-Tank Section consisted of two 106mm recoilless rifles, each 106 was mounted in a jeep. A Sergeant with a three man anti-tank crew manned each 106.

In addition to the cavalry platoons an artillery forward observer (FO), Captain Tom Mahoney, a Sergeant who was the assistant FO, and their driver, all mounted in one jeep, were attached to the Troop.

Beginning in early July through October 1969 Troop D from Fire Support Base (FSB) Buttons conducted both dismounted operations in the jungle and rubber plantations, and mounted reconnaissance missions along the vast and intricate network of trails, roads, highways and other lines of communication throughout Phu'ó'c Long Province. FSB Buttons, located at the northern base of Nui Ba Ra Mountain and about 5 miles west of Phu'ó'c Long City and Song Bé, was the headquarters base of the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Also on Buttons was a howitzer battery consisting of six towed 105mm cannons that provided fire support for the 5th Battalion and Troop D.

On Saturday, September 13, 1969, the Troop had proceeded from Buttons with two platoons, White and Blue, on its mission to establish strong points along secondary Road 311 from its junction with the principal Highway QL14 about 30 miles northeast of Dôn Luân. The first platoon, Red, was on detached duty providing security for Troop B located at a Fire Support Base near An Lôc. Further, about three weeks earlier all six of Troop D's recoilless rifles and their crews had been air lifted to the top of Nui Ba Ra.

On top of the mountain was a major communications complex that not only provided radio relay but also housed sophisticated surveillance and detection equipment that monitored infiltration movement. An infantry company and Troop D's six recoilless rifles protected this communications detachment and massive amount of equipment from enemy attacks and sapper assaults.

On this day several provincial policemen were with the Troop. Their mission was to stop all vehicles moving along Road 311 and to conduct inspections. This area in Phu'ó'c Long Province west and south of Phu'ó'c Long City and Song Bé was a major infiltration highway for North Vietnamese Regular Army forces that moved down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and entered South Vietnam from Cambodia.

From its southern junction with QL 14, 311 is a secondary, two-lane, asphalt road that winds its way north and west over rolling terrain, through open plain, jungle and rubber plantations and connects with Highway LTL1A. Highway LTL1A begins about 15 miles north of Saigon and ends at a junction with Highway QL14A approximately two miles from the Cambodian border just south of Bu Dop.

From QL14 US Army engineers, using Rohm plows, had cleared the large jungle growth for about 50 yards from both sides of 311 to the tree lines. Within the clearing lay remnants of downed trees where grass and undergrowth had sprouted tall, above waist high on an average sized person.

On this quiet Saturday Sergeant Skidgel and his crew were in a strong point position on a little knoll about one mile north of the junction of 311 and QL14.

Each strong point position was located to enable supporting observation. From the junction of 311 and QL14, which was the southernmost Troop strong point, where I was positioned with a Scout vehicle, we could see Sergeant Skidgel's position. And, from his position he could see us as well as the next position to his north, even though the distances between positions could be several hundred or several thousand yards apart.

It was late afternoon. The day had been uneventful and it was time to wrap it up and head for Buttons. I gave the order over the radio to the platoon leaders to mount up and begin moving north along 311. The Scout vehicle with me followed as we moved north toward Sergeant Skidgel's position. We saw his jeep moving slowly along the road before disappearing down over the knoll.

Suddenly, we heard heavy automatic weapons fire erupt ahead of us. My driver, Private First Class Ferguson, sped up. When we topped the small knoll where Sergeant Skidgel had been we saw his jeep about two hundred yards down the road stopped on the right edge. We pulled up near his jeep and hastily dismounted. I ran forward. Sergeant Skidgel was kneeling behind the right front wheel of his jeep and was firing his rifle across the front of the vehicle. His machine gunner and driver also had dismounted and were firing into the tree line.

It is still in my memory of kneeling beside him and seeing him smile and nod, a look of excitement on his youthful face. Acknowledging our arrival he reported the contact: heavy automatic weapons fire from the tree line west of the road by an estimated force of from eight to twelve enemy soldiers. No one in his squad had been hurt.

From the north two other scout jeeps arrived and for the next few seconds we all poured heavy rifle and machine gun fire into the tree line. We stopped firing and cautiously moved forward to search for the enemy soldiers. We found equipment; backpacks, equipment harnesses, communications wire, and evidence of wounded or killed enemy soldiers but no bodies. It was determined that they had spent some time in the location because of the marked improvements that had been made and the firing positions that were established.

Now the sun was setting. By the time our search of the enemy positions was completed a pair of fighter-bombers that was diverted to our location had arrived. The FO directed their attack west of the tree line where they dropped their bombs. Our day ended and we resumed the march toward Buttons. The policemen with us were exhilarated by the brief combat experience but they also were happy for their mission to be ended and told us goodbye as we dropped them off at their camp near Song Be.

Upon arrival at Buttons a complete battle report was submitted. Later that evening during a command briefing with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Healy, commander of the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry and of FSB Buttons, a reconnaissance mission was planned to determine what size force was in the area and to find and fix the enemy.

It was decided that Troop D would pick up the 5th Battalion Reconnaissance (Recon) Platoon the next day, Sunday, September 14, from their position on the south side of Nui Ba Rah. The Recon Platoon had been providing security for three 105mm howitzers from Buttons that had been positioned on the south side of the mountain to be able to provide fire support for units operating south of Buttons. Troop D would transport the Recon Platoon to the battle site. The platoon members would surreptitiously slip off the cavalry vehicles as we moved south along the road. They would then consolidate under concealment and begin infiltrating the area to conduct a thorough reconnaissance to pick up the trail. Troop D would reestablish strong points along 311 to be available to respond quickly and provide support or relief if the Recon Platoon got into trouble before being able to fade into the jungle.

Troop D arrived at the temporary howitzer position on the south side of Nui Ba Ra about 10:00am on Sunday morning, September 14. The battery had not completed packing but the Recon Platoon was ready to depart. It had been decided that the three towed cannons did not need a security escort on their return to Buttons.

Our combat power was reduced because of the loss of the 106 recoilless rifles and crews, work details on Buttons, illnesses and R&R absences. As we reviewed the mission and discussed our plans we took stock of the size of our force: there were 22 troopers in the second platoon, 24 in the third platoon and 15 members in the Recon platoon. So, counting the FO and his two-man team and Ferguson and me our combined strength totaled 66.

Because of normal rotational practice it was the second platoon's time to lead the mission. The second platoon leader had departed that morning to Phu'ó'c Vinh, the 1st Cavalry Division base camp, to pick up the Troop payroll in preparation for payday on Monday. So, the second platoon was being led by the platoon sergeant and it was decided the Recon Platoon Leader and his radio operator would ride with him.

The Recon platoon members would be spread throughout the Troop on the jeeps and at the agreed upon point and signal individually they would slip off the slow moving vehicles and fade into the tall grass alongside the road.

At about 11:30am we mounted up and departed the artillery's position with the second platoon leading. We had elected to complete the drop off first and then after establishing strong points we would have our C-ration lunch in position.

We crossed the east-west creek near the hamlet of Ap Binh Lan where a Regional Forces (RF)/Popular Forces (PF) camp was located. The RF/PF soldiers and many of the families were along the side of the road as we moved past. We all waved. Neither of the two US Army advisors, who were assigned to the camp, was present. Beyond this creek 311 snakes along high ground for a few hundred yards and then straightens out for a two to three mile stretch through a sweeping, shallow valley to the top of the next hill where the brief encounter the day before had occurred.

As his two lead scout jeeps topped the high ground above the creek near the hamlet the second platoon sergeant, whose radio call sign was White Mike, requested permission to conduct a reconnaissance by fire. The second platoon infantry squad followed him and my jeep was behind the infantry squad truck. The FO followed my jeep, then came the second platoon 81mm-mortar squad followed by the two jeeps of the other scout squad of the second platoon. Throughout the length of the entire cavalry column each vehicle was positioned at the standard operating combat distance of about 50 yards between each vehicle.

After securing permission from Buttons, I gave the okay to conduct the recon by fire. White Mike's lead scout jeep was by then almost through the bottom of the shallow valley. As it began its ascent toward the hilltop it began firing its pedestal-mounted machine gun in a 180° arc. The second scout jeep machine gun also was fired into the tree lines, first on the north side of the road and then on the south.

The lead scout jeep topped the hill and the area exploded in a fusillade of rifle and machine gun fire and a barrage of B40 rockets from both sides of the road. The entire length of the Troop column, which was about one and a half miles long, was engulfed in this withering assault. What would turn out to be a four and one half-hour battle had started.

The recon by fire had provided the early trigger to a classic horseshoe shaped ambush that had been established by a large enemy force, later estimated to be a regimental sized force of approximately 600. Because of the early trigger the rear of the Troop was extended beyond the northern most enemy positions. This prevented the North Vietnamese Regular Army forces from surrounding us.

A devastating shower of B40 rockets had hit the three lead jeeps. The Recon Platoon Leader and his RTO, riding in the back of White Mike's jeep, were instantly killed. White Mike and his driver were gravely wounded, and six other second platoon troopers were seriously wounded.

Ferguson and I dismounted and took cover on the right side of the jeep. The enemy automatic weapons fire was intense and B40 rockets were impacting short of our jeep. I pulled the portable radio out of the jeep and we moved away from the jeep expecting it to be hit at any moment. We were somewhat concealed in the tall grass at the edge of the road.

I switched channels on the portable radio and called Buttons to report our contact and to request helicopter gun ship support. I advised that I had only one radio and that I would be switching back to the troop radio frequency to manage the fight.

Ahead of us I could see the second platoon infantry squad truck and White Mike's jeep, which was on fire. I also could see the second scout jeep but I could not see the lead scout jeep, or any of the troops. I could hear some of their weapons firing mixed in with the long bursts of many enemy automatic weapons.

Behind us, down into the shallow valley, I could see the many of the third platoon's vehicles. The FO's jeep, which always followed my jeep, was on fire. I could see troopers moving near the edge of the road. They were firing into the tree line on both sides of the road, red tracers slamming into the target locations.

Ferguson and I were pinned down, as were the troopers at the head of the column. When we tried to move we all drew a hail of automatic weapons fire. Ferguson provided cover as I talked on the radio with Blue. I could not establish contact with White Mike, the Recon Platoon Leader or any one in the second platoon. Soon I was talking to Colonel Healy, Cavalier Red, the third platoon leader of Troop C, who was piloting a Cobra gun-ship, and a Blue Max aerial rocket artillery gun ship directing their supporting fires into suspected enemy positions and along the tree lines on both sides of the road.

As the battle progressed I asked Blue to try to shift a covering fire in our direction, which would permit Ferguson and me to move out of the kill zone to better cover.

Sergeant Skidgel's jeep was the second scout jeep leading the third platoon and that platoon's order of movement was similar to the second platoon.

Apparently responding to Blue's instructions to try to shift fire toward our position Sergeant Skidgel and his jeep driver scrambled from their concealed position to a jeep. I could see the jeep about 700 yards away move out of the tall grass. He was mounting his machine gun on the pedestal as the driver drove onto the road headed in our direction.

Sergeant Skidgel stood up behind the pedestal-mounted machine gun and fired into the tree line on both sides of the road near our position. Enemy fire into our position abruptly halted. A couple of B40 rockets landed alongside the road behind the jeep.

Other troopers in the third platoon also shifted their fire in our direction providing a covering fire for Sergeant Skidgel and his driver.

Suddenly Sergeant Skidgel was hit. The jeep was about 500 yards from our position. His right arm projected out and behind him, searching for the right rear fender of the jeep, his left hand continuing to hold onto the machine gun. He pulled himself up to stand behind the machine gun again and managed to fire a short burst into the tree line and into the tall grass near us. The jeep had closed to within about 200 yards from our position.

Then, he was hit again as enemy gunfire zeroed in on the moving target. Sergeant Skidgel slumped behind his machine gun, but he managed to sit on the right rear fender before a final burst of fire knocked him off the jeep. The jeep had slowed to a crawl.

Sergeant Skidgel tumbled off the right rear fender and fell backwards onto the road. He lay in the center of the road and did not move. The jeep veered off the road and rolled to a stop. The driver quickly dismounted and disappeared into tall grass.

Later a medic reported that Sergeant Skidgel's wounds had been instantly fatal.

Eventually we were able to secure a landing zone for an infantry company that was brought into the battle area by helicopter. Several of Sergeant Skidgel's friends came to his poncho wrapped body to say their good-byes. They all wanted to help, and carefully lifted him onto the first helicopter to be taken out of the battle area to the Division base camp.

Sergeant Skidgel's leadership had rallied members of his platoon. His direct and immediate action had broken the enemy's hold and relieved the pressure on the head of the column. His conspicuous bravery, above and beyond the call of duty, had saved the life of several of his fellow troopers who had been in the heart of the enemy kill zone.

He was very special. We will be forever indebted to, and will always remember, Sergeant Donald Sidney Skidgel. Posted by: Andrew J. Hudson
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Relationship: Served with him
Friday, December 18, 1998