Childress of Tuscaloosa hired a slave to Edward Smith at St. Stephens. Smith called in a physician, John Meeker, to attend the slave. Meeker sought to recover payment from Childress, but the lower court ruled against him. Meeker appealed and Judge Crenshaw affirmed the lower court?s decision. The hirer was obligated to pay the physician under these circumstances. This would be the case unless specific arrangements were made otherwise. Meeker v Childress, Minor 109 (1823).

A slave hired for one year became disabled after several months. Judge Minor ruled that the hirer still owed the full amount, unless there had been a specific agreement to the contrary. The same would have been true if the slave had run away. Outlaw and McClellan v Cook, Minor 257 (1824).

Nathaniel F. Williams and Henry Hitchcock owned the steamboat Little Erie, which was operated by George Davis. Davis hired a slave belonging to Henry W. Taylor to work as a steward on board. The slave was killed when he slipped and fell into the pit of the flywheel, which was not protected by slats as it should have been. Taylor sued to recover the value of the dead slave. The court charged the jury that the defendants were guilty if they had been negligent in running the boat without slats. The court found for the plaintiff, but on appeal Judge Hopkins ruled that the trial court should have specified the degree of negligence. In the case of a slave or free man hired to work on the boat, gross negligence, "a failure in the lowest degree of prudence," must have occurred. A hired worker, or slave working for hire, assumed some risk of accident and injury. Williams and Hitchcock v Taylor, 4 Porter 234 (1836).

On December 23, 1833, Aaron Perry hired two slaves to Augustin Hewlett and others. Hewlett agreed to pay $150 for the pair and to return them by December 25 of the next year. One of the slaves, Fanny, died in June. Hewlett permitted the other slave to visit Perry, who detained him. Judge Hopkins ruled that Hewlett sill owed Perry the agreed upon price, despite the death of Fanny. On the other hand, Hewlett?s debt was discharged because Perry detained the other slave before the expiration of the agreement. Perry v Hewlett, 5 Porter 318 (1837).

In 1834 Abraham Ricks hired three slaves to Harvey Dillahunty. One of the slaves died during the term. Judge Collier ruled that the hirer bore the loss, unless otherwise stipulated, even though the death was an act of God. Ricks v Dillahunty, 8 Porter 133 (1838).

An Alabama master purportedly hired a slave to a resident of Pascagoula, Mississippi. The slave became ill, but the bailee was not available. A physician treated the slave and billed the master, who refused to pay. The lower court ruled that the master was not liable because he had not authorized the treatment. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the decision. Judge Ormond ruled that a master came under "a moral and legal obligation" to supply the slave?s wants. He owed this duty to the slave and to the community and could not absolve himself from it. If the slave was beyond his control, he had to provide "some person to stand in the relation of master to the slave." In Johnson v Campbell (9 Porter 210) the court had compared this obligation to that of a father to his children. Furthermore, the ruling in Johnson declared that under "peculiar circumstances" masters were liable for necessities furnished to slaves without their knowledge. In the present case, no evidence existed that the slave had been hired out. If it did, the bailee certainly had some responsibility, but the master could not, by his contract with another, absolve himself of all responsibility. Gibson v Andrews, 4 Alabama 66 (1842).

Brantley hired a male slave from Willis for one year beginning January 1, 1841. During the term of the contract, Willis heard that Brantley operated a small grog shop, where slaves brought stolen property for sale. Consequently, Willis repossessed the slave before the term expired. Brantley sued in Dallas Circuit Court, lost, and appealed. Judge Ormond ruled that an implied stipulation prohibited the use of hired slaves for illegal activities. Under such circumstances, the owner could rescind the contract. The hirer would then be responsible only for the actual value of the services performed. In this case, however, Willis had not proven that Brantley employed the slave in illegal activities. Hence the lower court?s judgment was reversed and remanded. In theory, however, such a contract could be rescinded because of the potential damage inflicted upon the owner "by debauching the morals of his slave." Ormond feared that "in the downward career of vice," with one crime leading to another "of deeper dye," the slave might eventually forfeit his life. Rasco and Brantley v Willis, 5 Alabama 38 (1843).

Carr hired a slave from Hogan for one year. During the course of the contract, the slave needed medical treatment, but Carr refused to provide it. A physician advised the owner that without medical attention the slave might lose his leg or even his life. Hogan took his slave without Carr?s permission, had him treated, and then returned him. Carr refused to accept. The Marengo County Court ruled that, in taking the slave without Carr?s permission, Hogan had broken the contract. On appeal, Judge Ormond reversed and remanded the decision. Carr had been responsible for providing medical care. When he failed to do so, Hogan did. Legally, Hogan could have kept the slave without breaking the contract. In attempting to return him, he made Carr liable for the entire amount of the hire. Hogan v Carr, 6 Alabama 471 (1844).

Wier hired two slaves from Buford, agent for Eleanor Williams. One of the slaves, Fanny, ran away and returned to Mrs. Williams. Wier asked for her return, but Mrs. Williams replied that he had treated the slave cruelly and had no right to retain her. Wier informed Mrs. Williams that if Fanny were not returned by the next day he would consider the contract void. Fanny stayed. At the trial, it came to light that the slaves actually belonged to the minor children of Eleanor and Samuel J. Williams. The lower court charged the jury that Wier should have dealt with the husband. On appeal, Judge Goldthwaite ruled that Wier reasonably presumed that Mrs. Williams either had a separate estate in the slaves or that her husband allowed her to act for herself. Wier v Buford, 8 Alabama 134 (1845).

John Stubblefield mortgaged Sally and her daughter. In 1836 he gave his son, William, money to redeem them. William spent some of the money and borrowed more from Ragland. He later redeemed the slaves and hired them to Ragland, who apparently believed that William owned them. In June, 1838, William again took possession of the slaves and soon thereafter married Oden?s daughter. Later in 1838, Sally and her children ran away from William and returned to John. John allowed William to take the slaves back, but his son agreed to return them at an unspecified time. Meanwhile, on April 18, 1839, John gave Sally and her three children to William, but retained a life estate in them. On the same day, William sold the slaves to Oden for the recovery of Sally and her three children. Under the statute of frauds, William owned the slaves if he had three years? continuous possession. John contended that when the slaves ran away from William they broke possession. Judge Collier agreed and ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Stubblefield vs Oden, 9 Alabama 651 (1846).

On January 23, 1847, William Nesbitt hired Jeffro and Daniel from John Drew to work in a sawmill. He gave Drew a promissory note for $168, payable on January 25, 1848. By terms of the contract, Drew agreed to deduct all time lost "by sickness or otherwise." On September 2, 1847, Jeffro took sick, went home, and never returned. Drew also withdrew Daniel from service because Nesbitt had employed him to raft logs down the river and the slave could not swim. The court charged the jury that if they believed the facts of the case, then Nesbitt owed Drew for the time actually worked. On appeal, Nesbitt argued that the master had a legal and moral obligation to protect a slave?s life. Judge Chilton agreed that Drew had broken the contract and could not recover. Sawmill hands customarily rafted logs. Drew should not have contracted for Daniel to work in a sawmill if he feared his employment at this task. Chilton noted, however, that a master could recall a hired slave if the latter were placed in a perilous situation not anticipated, as the court had ruled in Hogan v Carr (6 Alabama 471).** Nesbitt v Drew, 17 Alabama 379 (1850).

In 1848 William Knox hired the slave William from John Drish. The contract called for the hirer to furnish food, clothing, and lodging. That spring, William contracted a bad case of "brain fever." The master directed Dr. Sims to attend William, but the doctor requested payment from Knox. The court charged the jury to find for Knox, if they believed his evidence. On appeal, Sims argued that the hirer of a slave was liable for medical services. Knox contended that the contract stipulated food, lodging, and clothing, but not medical services. Judge Dargan wrote that "the settled law of the state" generally provided that the hirer provide medical services. Even if the contract stipulated otherwise, "the laws of humanity" might dictate that the hirer does so. On the other hand, the hirer was not responsible for services rendered at the request of the owner. Furthermore, in this case, the contract stipulated that the hirer provides food, clothing, and lodging, but failed to mention medical attention. What motive could have been behind this, other than to limit the liability of the hirer?Sims v Knox, 18 Alabama 236 (1850).

In 1844 Moseley hired a slave woman named Adaline to Wilkinson, who proposed to use her as a cook. Before the term expired, Wilkinson hired Adaline to Hughes, who employed her as a field hand. Subsequently, she took sick and died. The court charged the jury that Wilkinson was liable if he had rehired the slave as indicated. On appeal, Moseley argued that the rehire amounted to a wrongful conversion of Adaline?s labor. Wilkinson contended that the burden was on Moseley to prove that the slave died due to a breach of duty. Judge Parsons ruled that the rehire did not authorize recovery and that Moseley had failed to show that the slave?s death resulted from a breach of duty. Wilkinson v Moseley, 18 Alabama 288 (1850).

In 1847 Smith hired a female slave to Hooks. Though hired as a cook, the woman became "ill natured and unmanageable," so Hooks put her to work in the field. In that capacity, she was crossing a creek on a log, fell in, and was drowned. Smith sued to recover and Judge Parsons ruled in his favor. The contract had stipulated that she be employed as a cook. Hooks v Smith, 18 Alabama 338 (1850).

Myers hired a slave to Gilbert. The contract stipulated that he would work as a deck hand on the steamboat Montezuma, which ran between Mobile and New Orleans. On one run, the boat detoured up the Tombigbee River to pick up slaves bound for New Orleans. Myers? slave fell in the river and drowned. Myers asked the court to charge the jury that Gilbert?s newspaper advertisement implied a route between Mobile and New Orleans, not detours upriver. Instead, the court instructed the jury to consider the advertisements, along with other evidence, in determining the exact nature of the contract. On appeal, Judge Chilton ruled that Gilbert had broken the contract. Myers v Gilbert, 18 Alabama 467 (1850).

In 1852 E.W. Marks of Dallas County hired the slave King to Jesse J. Seay. The contract did not stipulate how King would be employed, but Seay used him to work in a livery stable. Later, Seay hired King to Nance who used him in rafting logs down the Alabama River. King was drowned along with five others as they crossed the river in a skiff during high winds. The lower court admitted oral testimony as to King?s employment, though there had been a written contract that did not stipulate how he would be used. On appeal, Judge Chilton ruled that the oral testimony was inadmissible because there had been a written contract. Furthermore, unless the contract stipulated otherwise, slaves could be rehired and used in any employment common to those of their status. On the other hand, if the hirer used the slave in an unusually hazardous capacity where he was killed or injured, the master could recover. Seay v Marks, 23 Alabama 532 (1853).

In 1844 Robert A. Moseley hired Adeline to Beverly N. Wilkinson. The contract called for her to be employed as a cook in the city of Montgomery. Wilkinson rehired Adeline to Hughes, who used her as a field hand. In this capacity, she took sick and died. Wilkinson alleged that Moseley subsequently accepted payment for the hire, with full knowledge of the conversion and Adeline?s death. This, he said, ratified his use and treatment of her. Moseley sued to recover. On appeal, Judge Goldthwaite ruled a slave hired for a particular service could not be converted to another. See Hooks v Smith (18 Alabama 388). On the other hand, Moseley?s acceptance of payment with knowledge of the conversion prevented him from recovery. This case had come before the court earlier (18 Alabama 288) and would again (30 Alabama 562). Moseley v Wilkinson, 24 Alabama 411 (1854).

George W. Law hired a slave to one McNeill. The slave ran away and McNeill sent his son to find him, which he did at the home of Anselm B. Easley, administrator of Law?s estate. Young McNeill demanded the slave, but Easley refused to deliver him, claiming the slave had been mistreated. Easley further said he wanted to speak with the elder McNeill, or his overseer, before the slave would be returned. McNeill then sent a second son to demand the slave. Easley informed him that the slave had been instructed to return. Instead of returning, however, he ran away. Judge Goldthwaite ruled that the master could not claim hire if he took the slave when there had been no violation of the contract. Furthermore, sending the slave back alone did not excuse the refusal to return him on demand. McNeill v Easley, 24 Alabama 455 (1854).

George B. Gayle hired a slave for one month to George Petty. Their terms were $15 for twenty-six working days. Later, under the impression that Petty?s month had been worked out, Gayle rehired the slave. Petty claimed two more days, so Gayle returned the slave, who worked only a day and a half. One witness testified that local custom called for pro rata payment in such cases. On appeal, Judge Goldthwaite ruled that the contract was entire and could not be pro rated. The slave had not worked the full term, so Petty owed Gayle nothing. Petty v Gayle, 25 Alabama 472 (1854).

Samuel Nelson hired a slave named Sam for the year 1850. One Saturday night, late in April, Sam requested a pass to visit his wife. Nelson instructed his overseer to have Sam wait until the next morning, as the creek was high and might be dangerous to cross at night. Sam left that night, anyway. When the overseer went into the field Monday morning, Sam picked up a club, put it under his arm, and returned to the home of his master, John F. Bondurant. Bondurant whipped Sam and had him returned to Nelson, who took him by the collar. Sam then pulled a knife and cut Nelson in several places. Nelson called for his wife to bring a rope, but Sam cut her in the face and attempted to stab a slave woman who came to her relief. Nelson then threw Sam to the ground, where his head struck a root or stump. Finally, Sam was bound hand and foot and whipped. All this took place on Monday morning. The following Sunday, Sam died. Several doctors testified at the trial. Those for Bondurant said that Nelson?s whipping could have killed him. Those for Nelson said the blow to the head could have done the same. The court charged the jury that if they believed Nelson?s whipping alone, or in combination with other injuries, killed Sam, who was then bound and helpless, then the defendant would be liable for his value. On appeal, Judge Goldthwaite remanded the case. Sam?s being bound was irrelevant. The question was whether or not the punishment was barbarous or cruel.Nelson v Bondurant, 26 Alabama 341 (1855).

In 1852 Burke hired Allen to a railroad. The contract contained no specifications regarding the work Allen would perform. During the first part of the year, Allen worked as an ox driver, hauling saw logs to a steam mill near Selma. In June the mill moved up the line into Perry County, where Allen was rehired to a contractor as an ox driver. In November he became ill and on a cold, rainy night was sent down the railroad to Selma. In Selma an agent of the railroad took Allen into his own house. The next morning, the agent called a physician, who pronounced Allen?s illness "dropsy of the chest." The slave died forty hours later. In Dallas County Circuit Court, the defendant asked the judge to charge the jury that no liability existed if the company "exercised that degree of care and attention, which the generality of men use in relation to their own slaves." The court refused. On appeal, the defendant cited the lower court?s failure to charge the jury as had been requested. Judge Rice ruled that the lower court had erred in this and other particulars and remanded the case. If a master wanted a hired slave to receive extraordinary care, the contract must stipulate so. Alabama and Tennessee Rivers Railroad Company v Burke, 27 Alabama 535 (1855).

Early in 1853, Thomas F. Murphy, agent of Zebulon D. Bragg, placed the employer?s slave Nias in the possession of Robert B. Farrow. Nias was not hired to Farrow, but simply placed in his possession until Bragg should call for him. Bragg affirmed the agreement before he died in May. At year?s end, Farrow sent Nias to John D. Adair, administrator for Bragg?s estate. Adair also hired two Bragg slaves to Farrow, Jack and Ransom. Later, Adair took the slaves back over Farrow?s objection. The court charged the jury that, if they believed the evidence, the bailment of Nias terminated upon Bragg?s death and that Farrow owed the estate reasonable hire from that date until he returned the slave to Adair. Furthermore, if they believed the evidence, Adair could recover reasonable hire for the time Farrow had Jack and Ransom. On appeal, Farrow argued that his possession of Nias was not a bailment, but a gratuitous deposit. Hence he owed no hire without demand and refusal. Second, he argued that Adair violated the contract for the hire of Jack and Ransom. Judge Stone reversed the lower court?s decision. Farrow v Bragg?s Administrator, 30 Alabama 261 (1857).

In February 1844, Robert A. Mosely hired Adeline to Beverly N. Wilkinson. The contract called for Wilkinson to employ her as a cook in the city of Montgomery. In March or April, however, Wilkinson rehired Adeline to Andrew B. Hughes, who had a plantation on the Alabama River, where she was employed as a field hand. In late July or early August, Adeline became ill with a chill and fever. The overseer administered calomel one evening and castor oil the following morning. That evening, Adeline was worse and complained of a pain in her side. The overseer took a half-pint of blood and placed a mustard plaster on her stomach, side, and wrists. She died the next morning. Moseley contended that Wilkinson had broken the contract by rehiring Adeline and that he had failed to provide a physician when one was needed. The court charged the jury that, if they believed a physician should have been called, then the burden was on Wilkinson to show that proper medical care had been provided. On appeal, Judge Stone ruled that Wilkinson could have broken the contract because Mosely misrepresented Adeline as a cook, but he was not justified in rehiring her as a field hand. On the second charge, each of the following propositions should have been submitted to the jury--the slave needed a physician, the hirer had a duty to supply one, and he failed to do so, and, as a consequence, the slave died. Consequently, Stone reversed the decision and remanded the case. Wilkinson v Moseley, 30 Alabama 562 (1857).

Harris hired Gabe and Mary to Maury for one year (1852) at $175. Maury subsequently rehired them to Allison. Gabe ran away and returned to Harris. Both Maury and Allison requested Gabe?s return, but Harris refused. Judge Rice ruled that Harris had broken the contract by refusing to return Gabe. Consequently, Maury owed him nothing for either slave. Harris v Maury, 30 Alabama 679 (1857).

In September 1856, Dixon S. Hall sued Elias B. Goodson in the Circuit Court of Autauga County for damages inflicted on a slave named Simon. Hall had hired Simon to Goodson for the year 1855 at the price of $120. In June of that year, Simon ran away, was captured, and returned to Goodson. At one point, he had threatened his pursuer with a pine knot. Goodson took Simon and said that he intended to whip him with a cowhide. Simon ran away again and returned to Hall. At that time, he had scars and wales on his back, side, and legs, some of which were visible a year later. Hall kept Simon in his possession for the remainder of the year. After the close of the year, and before commencement of the suit, Goodson paid the hire in full. The court charged the jury that, if they believed Hall had accepted payment in full, he could not recover. Judge Stone ruled that receipt of the hire could not be regarded as an implied waiver of the owner?s right to sue for trespass. Goodson had not bargained for the right to inflict cruel and unreasonable punishment. Hall?s right to recover was no less perfect than if he had not accepted payment. Hall v Goodson, 32 Alabama 277 (1858).

James A. McEwen bought two slaves for the use of his mother, Mrs. John Sims. When McEwen died, his executor, Henry Boynton hired the slave to Howell. Mr. Sims took possession of them without the permission of either Boynton or Howell. Howell informed Boynton that he would neither sue for their recovery nor pay hire. Furthermore, he urged Boynton to sue for them, which he did. Judge Rice ruled that Boynton could sue for recovery before the end of the contract period. Sims v Boynton, 32 Alabama 353 (1858).

In 1858 Squire Lowry, who operated a Perry County plantation, hired a slave named Orange under general contract. One of Lowry?s sons, who was over the age of twenty-one, loaned Orange to Fort to assist in erecting a gin house. In the course of this work, a timber fell and killed the slave. Judge R.W. Walker ruled that a slave hired as a plantation hand might well assist in raising a gin house, should the need arise, but he could not be hired or loaned to another for that specific purpose because of the unusual danger involved. In such a case, the hirer and individual who received the gratuitous loan were equally liable. Jones v Fort, 36 Alabama 449 (1860).

Mary Howard owned a slave named George. Acting as her daughter?s agent, Martha Howard hired George to Allen Coleman. As part of the contract, Martha agreed to pay George?s medical expenses and Mary offered no objection. George contracted smallpox and Coleman?s wife asked Martha to call in a physician, but she refused to do so. Mary sued Coleman for negligence in exposing George to smallpox and for failure to provide proper medical care. Judge R.W. Walker ruled that the circumstances of the hiring raised the legal presumption that Martha Howard acted as the agent for her daughter, which relieved Coleman of any liability. Howard v Coleman, 36 Alabama 721 (1860).

Thomas Mahone gave or loaned several slaves to his daughter with the provision that he could recall them. Following the daughter?s death, her husband, Augustus McGehee, claimed the slaves because Mahone had not called for them during his daughter?s lifetime. Judge A.J. Walker ruled that Mahone?s "right to terminate the bailment" was not restricted to "the life-time of the bailee." McGehee v Malone, 37 Alabama 258 (1861).

William Tillman hired a slave to Dickinson Chadwick. Chadwick punished the slave to a degree Tillman considered unreasonable. He sued to recover damages for the injuries caused. In the course of his opinion, Judge Stone recognized the authority of a hirer to punish a slave, but noted that there existed a boundary beyond which force became unreasonable. The law could not define the boundary with precision, but it depended upon the nature of the offense, the frequency, and the slave?s attitude while being punished. Masters punished slaves to reduce them "to a proper state of submission, respect, and obedience to legitimate authority." Chastisement should secure the end with as little permanent injury as possible.Tillman v Chadwick, 37 Alabama 317 (1861).

The court's rulings on slave hireling contracts did not represent the norm on this subject, but rather what the court thought the norm should be. From this perspective, the law clearly placed great value upon slave property, primarily to protect the owner, but this also worked to the benefit of hired slaves. Logic would dictate that, as a rule, hirer's were more careless with slave property than owners. The court's decisions do not contradict that conclusion, but neither do they confirm it. The decisions also suggest a significant market for hired slaves, perhaps more often for commercial and industrial work as opposed to agricultural.

THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT ON SLAVES