Through the West Wall and on to the Rhine

On 1 February, General Middleton’s VIII Corps comprised the 87th, the 4th, and the 90th Infantry Divisions. The 4th, commanded by Brigadier General Harold Blakely, was on the line in the Ardennes when the Germans attacked in mid-December. Throughout December and January, the division took part in the long struggle to push the enemy back to the Rhineland. Now in pursuit of the retreating enemy, the 4th was preparing to take part in the VIII Corps’ assault through the Siegfried Line.

Known to the Germans as the West Wall, the line was a series of more than 3000 concrete pillboxes, bunkers, and observation posts that blocked the western approaches into the heart of Germany. Built by the Germans throughout the late 1930’s, the fortified positions extended along the western borders of Germany from the vicinity of Kleve, on the Dutch frontier, to Lorrach, near Basle on the Swiss border. To the German people the wall represented an impregnable line of defense. Most of the major bunkers were made of concrete two to three feet thick. They dominated high ground and were mutually supporting. Others were camouflaged in wooded terrain or made to look like houses. Intermixed with these bunkers were rows of dragon’s teeth (concrete tank obstacles). Extending from three to twenty miles in depth, the West Wall presented a major obstacle to the advancing Allies.

On 28 January, the 35th was given the mission of supporting the 4th Infantry Division as it prepared to attack the West Wall. General Blakely’s mission for the operation was to advance through the West Wall astride the Schnee Eifel* north of the West Wall strongpoint of Brandscheid, then turn north and seize Brandscheid itself. Once Brandscheid was secure, the 4th was to then advance eastward to the city of Pruem on the Pruem River.

“The only time I think I was scared during the war,” says Igo, “was when [LTC Symbol] said we were going to have to go in and attack one of the pillboxes with flame-throwers in support of the infantry. What concerned me was that we had never used a flame-thrower, and really didn’t know how to use one.”

However, as daunting an obstacle the West Wall seemed, little could be done by the Germans to man the entire line and even less time was available to prepare for the defense. By now, “the German army was no longer a cohesive force, but a number of fugitive battle groups, disorganized and even demoralized, short of equipment and arms,” as Allied intelligence analysts put it. The dramatic defeat in the Ardennes had cost the Germans greatly in men and materiel.

The 4th’s attack of the West Wall began a day early when, on 4 February, reconnaissance patrols found the initial line of pillboxes unmanned. In just two days, the infantrymen were able to break into the West Wall and seize Brandscheid.

Unfortunately, the 4th’s drive was slowed in the following days by stiff resistance combined with severe logistical problems caused by impassable roads. In late January the weather began to get unseasonably warm and by the first part of February the soldiers fighting in the Schnee Eifel were up to their elbows in mud, mud, and more mud. Not built for heavy military traffic, the roads of Belgium and Luxembourg had literally disintegrated under a combination of alternate freeze and thaw, daily rains and floods, and the coming and going of big tanks, trucks, and guns. The entire engineer strength of the VIII Corps was barely sufficient to keep the most essential supply routes open. So bad were the road conditions, supplies had to be dropped by parachute to the 4th Division’s lead regiment which had literally run out of ammunition.

Thrown once again into maintaining main supply routes (MSR’s), the engineers were prevented from taking part in the attack and were desperately trying to keep traffic rolling east. Ditches, clogged with destroyed enemy vehicles and equipment, were cleared and deepened to permit drainage into the surrounding fields. From their quarries, the engineers hauled tons of rock and sand for filling chuckholes and leveling the road surface. Where the road was completely gone, nearly a ton of rock per linear square foot of road was required.

At St. Vith, the 35th encountered some of its worst road conditions. St. Vith was devastated in the fighting during December when remnants of the 28th Infantry Division desperately tried to hold the city against an onslaught of German artillery and armor. In the end, however, the town was lost. An area of smoldering rubble, burning vehicles, and corpses, St. Vith remained only in name.

Called to St. Vith to help the 243rd Combat Engineer Battalion, the 35th required help from several surrounding units and the local civilians. Together, this ad hoc crew of engineers labored for four days hauling sand and stone, running dozers, laying corduroy, and digging ditches. “There was nothing left of that town,” says Jim Thomas. “We took bulldozers and just made roads through there. We had no idea where the original roads had been.”

In addition to road maintenance, Symbol’s men were engaged heavily in bridge repair and reconstruction. Hundreds of bridges had been either damaged or destroyed during the German offensive and subsequent retreat of December and January. Some bridging jobs required only the construction of a culvert to span a narrow stream while other jobs required lengthy Bailey, timber trestle, treadway, or pontoon bridges.

While supervising one of the bridge jobs, Captain Dearinger was approached by General Middleton. Middleton had been admiring the work of the engineers and asked, “Captain, what unit is this?”

“A Co, 35th Engineers, Sir,” answered Dearinger.

Smiling, the general said, “Ah yes, the good ol’ 35th.”

Certainly, Middleton must have reflected on how well the engineers had supported his corps on the Brittany Peninsula, across France, into Belgium, and most recently during the battle in the Ardennes.

Norman Igo recalls, “On one occasion CPT Rickertsen and I needed to inspect a bridge on a river that had been blown. The spans were lying in the water, but the piers and buttresses were still intact. We were climbing over them to get a look when a sniper on the other side of the river began to take pot shots at us. We ran and got behind a tree on our side of the river. Then all of a sudden, a shot hit right at the base on the right side of the tree, then another at the left. After that, we made a dash to some buildings behind us. Needless to say, we abandoned the idea of building a Bailey bridge at that location.”

Still, the most dangerous work involved removing enemy mines. Like snow, the mud created special hazards and difficulties, but the men continued. In one day alone, near Chenogne, Belgium, the men of C Co were able to clear more than nine miles of road. In total for the months of January and February 1945, the 35th was responsible for clearing mines from more than 210 miles of road. More than 1000 enemy mines of various types were removed and destroyed. Unfortunately, the 35th suffered five casualties as results of mine explosions; four soldiers slightly wounded and one soldier, PFC Charles Powell, seriously wounded. Powell received his wounds while taking down a bridge near Orreus, Belgium.

Though stalled on 11 February after entering the outskirts of the battle torn city of Pruem, the 4th Division’s drive gained new vigor at the beginning of March. Partly because the logistical situation had improved greatly, but mainly as the result of a new plan being executed by Patton’s Third Army.

Patton’s new plan was designed to thrust his army east to the Rhine River. The VIII Corps mission for the bold maneuver was to break out of the Pruem area, establish a bridgehead over the Kyll River, and rapidly thrust an armored division to the city of Brohl near the Rhine River. Thus, Middleton ordered the 4th Division to enlarge its bridgehead over the Pruem River, whereupon the re-attached 11th Armored Division was to pass through and strike due east to jump the Kyll, then strike northeast to the Rhine.

Heavy fighting resumed in Pruem as General Blakely’s infantrymen pushed to secure the city. During the lull of mid-February, the defending 5th German Parachute Division had worked hard to prepare defensive positions in and around Pruem. Fighting from well-organized positions, the Germans bitterly contested the 4th’s advance. Finally giving way to the superior 4th Division, the enemy withdrew, destroying the vital bridges over the river and blocking roads with trees and mined obstacles as it went.

On 1 March, the 35th was called forward to put a bridge over the Pruem. Fighting was still raging nearby as the engineers went to work and they were subjected to mortar and artillery fire. The bridge construction continued through the night and into the early morning. While the work progressed, some of the engineers cleared booby-trapped abatis and antitank mines from the roads. When the work finished and the bridge was opened for traffic at 0430, a heavy stream of tanks and supplies poured across the Pruem to aid the infantry on the far side.

On 5 March, the 35th was assigned a new mission and put in support of the 90th Infantry Division. The 90th, commanded by Major General James Van Fleet, was in the process of holding the VIII Corps right wing and driving east in the corps’ thrust toward the Rhine. While attached to the 90th, Symbol’s battalion operated water points, swept roads for mines, filled craters, maintained the main supply routes, and erected bridges. At Birresborn, the engineers constructed a 200-foot Bailey bridge over the Kyll River at night under ‘artificial moonlight.’ This light was created with the aid of searchlights projecting their high intensity light off low hanging clouds.

Crossing the Mosel River and the Capture of Koblenz

Like soldiers do, the men of the 35th adapted to the changing conditions throughout late winter, taking refuge in their friendships and the simple luxuries a soldier can find. Bob Taylor was a cook in Hritzko’s B Co. He made sure that his comrades always had something good to eat when they came back from long jobs. “John Standridge was my number one good buddy at that time,” he says. “I would keep the coffee at night and make pastries, mostly cakes. All the boys would beg for cake at night. I had to be very hardhearted because the cakes were for the next day and once you gave a piece out, that opened the door for everyone else to want a piece. John always got a piece. He would come by and we would shoot the bull at night. He was discreet about his piece and I never ‘gave’ him a piece. ‘I’m going to take a piece,’ he would say. ‘I won’t let anyone see me.’

“The guys were always suspicious of the army,” he continues. “It was rumored that they put something in the food to keep down the sex drive. John came by one night while I was making a cake batter. I did not have enough sugar so I grabbed a jar of saccharin tablets and threw some in. He sat there and didn’t say anything for awhile.”

“What are you putting in that cake,” John finally asked suspiciously.

“Oh, nothing,” I replied.

“Come on, tell me what those pills are,” he said.

“John, if I tell you, they’ll court martial me,” I replied.

“I promise that I will never tell a soul,” he said.

“Well, If you promise that you won’t tell, I guess I can trust you. These are ‘salt peter’ pills. The army makes me do this.” John never ate another piece of my cake even though I later told him several times that it was only saccharin.”

By March, the allied drive into Germany had the German army on the run. As soon as the Germans would establish defenses, the allies would break through, threatening to surround large German formations. After each break through, the Germans would scramble to the rear. Under such relentless pressure, German soldiers were surrendering in staggering numbers. The only hope that Hitler and the military’s high command had was to stop the Allies at the Rhine River. However, pressure was also mounting in the east where the Russian army was making a strong bid to break through the German forces on the Oder River and move on Berlin. General Eisenhower, realizing that the Russians were much closer to Berlin and more likely to be in the city before the allies, decided to drive his forces to other objectives and defeat the enemy east of the Rhine River.

Eisenhower knew that many of his generals inwardly desired to be the first to put troops over the famed German river. It was even a well-known fact that General George Patton and British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery had a running bet to see who would be the first to cross the Rhine. So when Eisenhower selected British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery to lead the attack across the Rhine from the Allies’ northern flank while the American units in the south remained in static positions, you can imagine the uproar. Eisenhower stuck to his guns and Montgomery went forward with preparations for a major offensive designed to crush the German war machine in the industrial Ruhr Valley and “bounce the Rhine”.

All bets as to who would cross the Rhine first came to an abrupt end on 7 March when the famous Ludendorf Bridge at Remagen was captured intact by troops of Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges’ First Army. As elements of the 9th Armored Division had neared the bridge, the Germans set off the demolitions and an enormous explosion sent timbers and debris flying in a huge cloud of dust and smoke. However, when the smoke cleared, to the amazement of everybody on both sides of the river, the bridge still stood. A small group of American soldiers rushed across the bridge and managed to hold it long enough for tanks and more infantrymen to come across.

Over the next several days, American forces continued to cross the Ludendorf, but only to hold the bridgehead. Though General Eisenhower had initially planned to route as many units as possible to the bridge, he changed his mind after his staff persuaded him that the Remagen area was not the ideal location to launch their major operations. On 17 March, ten days after its amazing capture, the giant bridge suddenly collapsed into the frigid Rhine. Dying with the bridge were twenty-eight American soldiers, most of them combat engineers who were doing repairs.

Never one to sit idly by and watch the action, General Patton quietly went forward with his own plans to get troops across the Rhine. Never moving so boldly as to draw attention to himself, Patton shuffled his Third Army units here and there, searching for the right moment to get his men across. Racing from headquarters to headquarters, Patton prodded his corps and division commanders to keep up the fight.

During one trip, Patton happened across some Symbol’s men who were moving debris from the roads and building a culvert. Jim Thomas recalls vividly the events that followed. “We went to a little town called Tres Vierges, I never will forget it,” says Thomas. “Well, there were two old German trucks that had gone over the bank and spilled out all their goods. We couldn’t let such an opportunity to collect some souvenirs pass; somebody just had to go down in there and investigate. We had gotten down to the trucks digging around when General Patton showed up! I had just come back up on the road and he jumped out of his jeep. I saluted, and he got his nose real close to mine. He says, ‘Soldier, where’s your piece?’ I said, ‘It’s in the truck, Sir.’ He said, ‘Where’s your helmet?’ I said, ‘It’s in the truck too.’ He looked around and then asked, ‘Where’s your sergeant?’ I said, ‘I don’t know, Sir. I don’t see him.’ Well, my squad sergeant, John Irving, had been standing there all along. He’s thanked me for saying that to this day!”

In his biography, “Troy H. Middleton”, by James Price, Middleton recalls:

“When the VIII Corps reached the Rhine, George [Patton] came to me and told me he would have to take all of my division but one. He said he was starting an operation up the Rhine with the XII Corps, that it would require more troops, and that the ultimate objective would be crossing the river near Mainz. George left me with only my corps troops, consisting of considerable artillery, and the 87th Infantry Division. Taking a leaf from George’s book, I asked him to let me capture Koblenz with the 87th. George laughed and said, ‘Only a fool would attempt such an operation with so few troops.’ I said, ‘Let me try; if I find it too well organized I can suspend the operation.’”

As was expected, Patton agreed with Middleton’s plan and the 87th went quickly into preparing for an assault crossing of the Mosel River and to capture the resort-city of Koblenz. Located at the tip of the so-called Mosel triangle, in the heart of Germany’s wine country, Koblenz held both strategic and symbolic importance.

Commanded by Brigadier General Culin, the 87th, nicknamed the “Golden Acorns”, had been rushed into the Ardennes to Middleton’s VIII Corps in late December. During heavy fighting against the Panzer Lehr at Jenneville, Pironpre, and St. Hubert, the 87th proved it was a worthy-fighting unit. The “Golden Acorns”, composed of the 345th, 346th, and 347th Infantry Regiments remained with Middleton’s corps throughout the continued battle, playing an instrumental role in pushing the Germans back into Germany. On March 13, the 35th received orders assigning it to the 87th Infantry Division to take part in the assault crossing.

By midnight on the 14th of March, the 87th had advanced to a position on the west bank of the Mosel River extending from a few kilometers north of Koblenz, located at the junction of the Mosel and Rhine Rivers, south along the Mosel to the city of Kobern. Throughout the 14th, the 35th’s reconnaissance section made extensive recons of the Mosel with the 347th Regiment, to whom the 35th would be attached for the crossing, in an effort to locate the best area to make the assault and emplace bridges. Having anticipated just such and operation, some of the engineers who had received special training in operating motor boats were gathered together a few days prior and had been collecting necessary equipment and rehearsing for the potential crossing.

Symbol’s mission for the Mosel crossing was received on the 15th. The 35th would be responsible for crossing the 347th Regiment in the vicinity of Kobern and Winningen and to subsequently put into operation a ferry for transporting supplies and evacuating wounded. Ferrying operation would continue until bridges were established. For bridging in their area, Symbol had the support of the 511th Light Pontoon Company.

Working closely with the 347th, Symbol helped to fine tune the plans for the crossing. The assault would be made at 0300 on the night of 16 and 17 March, under the cover of darkness. Both B and C Co, each with one platoon from CPT Dearinger’s A Co, would provide three engineers per assault raft to move the infantry to the west bank and return the rafts to the friendly side. Seventeen rafts per company would be on hand to do the job with several others in reserve. The remainder of A Co, with a group of specially trained motor boat operators from within the battalion, would be ready to go into action once the element of surprise was lost and to later build and operate the ferries. Officers from the battalion would be at both crossing sites to assist in controlling the movement of the infantry to the river and to the far shore. Once on the east bank, the 347th would drive the enemy forces from the from the Mosel triangle and to the east bank of the Rhine in the vicinity of Boppard while the 345th Regiment would capture Koblenz.

While planning proceeded, the engineers received the assault rafts, paddles, and other equipment from nearby supply depots. With their equipment, the engineers, along with their brothers in the infantry, rehearsed loading, paddling, and unloading drills. Special instructions were provided on the proper way to carry the rafts to the crossing sites and on the specifics of loading weapons such as mortars and machine guns.

While the engineers and the men of the 87th made their plans for the crossing, elements of the 6th SS Mountain Division and the 276th Volks Grenadier Division were hastily forming a defensive line on the river south of Koblenz. A true division only on paper, the 276th had suffered heavy losses in hard fighting throughout the winter. The 6th on the other hand was still a strong and capable fighting unit.

The 6th SS, commanded by General Karl Brenner, had fought viciously during January in the Vosges Mountains. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the division and Brenner’s men were moved south where they received replacements and were re-equipped. Initially expected to take place in a counterattack against Field Marshall Montgomery’s troops at Trier, the 6th was slowed by allied bombing and was not able to be used effectively in the counterattack.

After the war, Brenner wrote, “On 9 March the division received orders to proceed to the Simmern area where it was to concentrate and be placed at the disposal of Seventh Army. I reported 12 March to my new superior, General Hoehne, commander of LXXXIX Corps…[We] were to build up a new front west of the Mosel River, in order that the remnants of the battered German divisions could escape eastward across the river. The corps’ right boundary was at the mouth of the Mosel, the left at Brierden.

“Until now the only forces available for this operation had been the remnants of the 276th Infantry Division and the badly depleted 159th Infantry Division. Now the 6th SS Mountain Division was to reinforce these troops by taking over the right part of the corps sector.

“On 12 March, the reconnaissance battalion was the first element of the division to reach the new area. It was immediately employed by corps headquarters at the boundary between the 276th and the 159th.”

Of the 276th’s situation, its commander, Colonel Werner Wagner, wrote, “By order of the Army, [my] division was subordinated on 8 March to the LXXXIX Corps and was to move immediately all elements assembled at that time to the area northwest of Boppard.

“There the division received new orders to take over the sector between a point two kilometers northeast of Lay and Alken, and prepare for defense along the Moselle…Subordinated to us for this task were the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 6th SS Mountain Division and two engineer companies from the garrison of Koblenz which were employed near Lay and Winningen to run the ferry traffic across the Mosel.

“[Our] main line of resistance was established close along the Mosel. There were no positions prepared for defense in this area. Considering [our] weak forces and the width of the sector which was to be defended, the division did not expect to be able to put up an effective defense against strong American attacks. We were, first of all, short of heavy infantry weapons, antitank guns, assault guns, artillery, and ammunition. There was hardly enough infantry forces to cover completely the bank of the Mosel.”

Late in the afternoon of the 15th, while the Americans continued preparation for the assault, the plan was changed and the crossing was moved up to that night. Realizing that the enemy had not yet completed their defenses and that the 6th SS was closing in on the sector en masse, General Culin decided to put his men across early. CPT Rickertsen’s C Co would cross the First Battalion of the 347th at Winningen with one platoon of Company A, 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion and one platoon of Company C, 735th Tank Battalion. CPT Hritzko’s B Co would cross the Third Battalion of the347th with one platoon of Company A, 607th TD Battalion and one platoon of Company C, 735th Tank Battalion. Additionally, B Co would cross the Regimental reserve, Second Battalion of the 347th, once Third Battalion was across.

As night began to fall on the 15th, final preparations were made. Guides moved into position to lead the infantrymen and their rafts to the river, trucks parked far from the crossing in order not to give away their intentions, and the soldiers began their silent walk to the river. Filing down “Adolf Hitler Strasse” from their final assembly area to the point of crossing, the Third Battalion shouldered their boats and half carried, half dragged them through a hedgerow, over box cars, through wire fences and apple orchards until finally they had them on the cobblestone bank and silently began to load.

Norman Igo recalls the quiet approach at Winningen, “As we were gathering the men around each boat a short incident broke out with one of our men making a lot of noise. Of course, the attack is supposed to be made in complete secrecy. [This particular man] had gotten drunk. A major from the infantry said if he didn’t get quiet he would shoot him and pulled his pistol as if he might do so.”

The soldier in question was Private “Choppo” Espinosa. Espinosa and a few others had found a wine cellar earlier in the day and began sneaking a few drinks. Before long, the men were drunk. Ed Bonde wrote later, “Arrived at Winningen 0230. Walked from top of hill down to river about two miles. Had to be very quiet as Germans sitting on other side. Worked in view of them. Put boats in water about 3 a.m. Fairly dark and I was disgusted with Choppo as I had to row with him. Charlie [Cannon] was to steer.”

C Co was the first to push off. The first wave started across from Winningen at approximately 0345 with First Battalion. Only ten minutes later the men reached the far bank. It seemed that the element of surprise had been achieved because the enemy offered no resistance to the crossing. Only after the infantrymen began moving inland did firing begin. By 0545 the engineers had moved the entire First Battalion to the west bank. All that remained to cross were vehicles and the battalion’s rear command post.

B Co’s first wave left Kobern at 0500. As at Winningen, the trip lasted only ten minutes and encountered no resistance. However, while the engineers were returning to pick up the second wave, the Germans discovered the operation. Rifle and machine gun fire was directed at the engineers, causing one raft to sink. The engineers, though, were able to swim to shore. Quickly, the infantrymen on the far bank cleared out the enemy resistance at the river’s edge and by 0600 the engineers had completed Third Battalion’s crossing.

Continuing his account of the crossing, Bonde wrote, “Took first eight men across at 0350. Had trouble getting off sandbar at start. Got across with little trouble. Had awful hard time to get boat back to starting point. Small arms fire going on now. Lots of tracers. Took another load across. This time I steered boat. Made it easier this time. Got very wet and tired. Got everyone across before they threw in mortars. Our infantry fired a lot as they started up the hill.”

Hank Mooseker, a buck sergeant in A Co, First Battalion, recalls, “We reached mid stream and suddenly the boat was caught in a very swift current that made the boat rotate. After a couple of perilous moments and spins, we decided on the correct direction to the far shore and paddled furiously toward it.

“Evidently, we had come to the apex of the funnel of an old fish trap or weir built of stone that funneled the flow of the river toward the center of the river. The narrow confines of the funnel had so increased the water’s velocity that it had caused us to spin when our bow hit the current. In our confusion and furious paddling, our paddles hit the metal boat frequently and I thought the noise would waken every Jerry on the far bank.”

Just as we pulled out in trucks three mortars hit in town…Will never know how lucky we were as thirteen Germans said they had three machine guns trained on us all the time, but wanted to give up. Choppo started shooting from our side and got everybody shooting.”

With the lead battalions across the river, Colonel Tupper released Second Battalion to cross in Dearinger’s motor boats. By now it was daylight and the engineers hoped to make good use of their fast boats. Unfortunately, elements of Wagner’s 276th, located in Neiderfell on the high ground opposite Kobern, met them with heavy machine gun fire from the vicinity of Neiderfell. In the broad daylight, the GI’s were easy targets. Simultaneously, accurate mortar fire fell directly on the crossing site killing one of the A Co engineers and wounding another. Three of Second Battalion’s medics were also killed.

During the Second Battalion’s crossing the German fire continued and several men were wounded and a few of the engineers’ rafts were sunk. When an infantryman in his boat fell from his raft severely wounded, Private First Class William Shannon jumped into the water after him, pulling the man back up to the raft.

Directing their rafts toward other GI’s that had gone into the freezing water, Sergeant Elmer Christensen and Corporal Chris Biringer were able to rescue several men who were struggling in the water. Diving in for the men, Privates First Class Walter Bambrough, Walter Wilson, Paul Lagace, and Edward Smola all helped to pull the men to safety. Still, the engineers pushed the assault and had Second Battalion across before 0900.

By now Hank Mooseker and the other men in his squad had reached the high ground opposite Winningen. During their movement, Mooseker stumbled upon a German soldier sleeping soundly in his foxhole. “I prodded him with my rifle while I took his piece and made him understand he was my prisoner,” says Mooseker. “I tossed his Mauser into the brush, told him to be quiet, to get out of his foxhole, and made him stand up and turn around and put his hands on his head.”

While searching the lone soldier, Mooseker was pleased to find warm potatoes and Knock Worst in the German’s mess kit. Making quick work of the warm food, Mooseker and the his men continued on until they linked up with the rest of their company.

As the infantrymen pushed across the high ground on the far banks toward their objective, enemy opposition of the crossing sites subsided. However, the engineers were still subjected to intermittent mortar fire that was being observed and fired from Niederfell. Lieutenant Howard Goodchild was directing his men in the construction of the support rafts when the enemy poured in a few mortar rounds on his position. A few of the engineers were wounded. One of Goodchild’s men, Private First Class William Fink, braved the enemy fire and moved some of the wounded to safety. Goodchild maintained control of his operation and was able to continue the transfer of supplies across the river.

Though the engineers had already begun putting a floating treadway bridge across at Winningen, even before the assault was complete, it would be some time before the bridge was ready for traffic. While the bridge work continued, A Co operated infantry support rafts carrying tanks, jeeps, and ammunition. The operation of the ferries was crucial to keeping the infantrymen supplied on the east bank. These ferries, consisting of short spans of treadway bridge material rested on top of pontoons, were capable of hauling jeeps and tanks across the river. All that was needed was the pushing power of a couple motor boats. The first ferries went into operation around 1400 delivering much needed vehicles to the far bank.

On one such trip, Private First Class Joseph Giard was struck by rifle fire while directing the ferry to its landing site. Additional fire severely wounded the 347th’s Regimental Supply Officer, Major Cornell, and knocked a motor on one of the motor boats. Though wounded, Giard remained in position and guided the ferry to the far bank, being evacuated only after completing his mission.

Private First Class Joseph Flinn, one of the assault boat operators, was busy speeding ammunition across the river when on his second trip the shear pin of his propeller broke, leaving him helpless in the middle of the river. Flinn’s boat floated dangerously away from the crossing site into enemy territory. Spotting the inviting target, German soldiers fired into Flinn’s boat. Flinn was able to replace the shear pin under fire and return upstream, unharmed, at the amazement of both the Americans and the Germans. Flinn’s cargo was promptly delivered and he continued his task throughout the day.

Hoping to have the bridge complete by nightfall, Colonel Tupper pressed Symbol, but Symbol explained that unless his men received search lights to provide “artificial moonlight” the job would not be done. Though Colonel Tupper tried to get the lights, none could be found and the engineers finished the 470’ foot bridge the morning of the 17th.

Throughout the 16th, things in the 347th’s sector progressed much faster than had been expected. To expedite the crossing of the 345th, General Culin proposed that Colonel Sugg utilize the 347th’s crossing sites where Symbol’s men had been able to get the infantrymen rapidly across. Sugg liked the idea and by noon, the First Battalion of the 345th, commanded by Major John Muir, was headed for Winningen. Dearinger’s men began moving Muir’s battalion across at 1300. On reaching the west bank of the Mosel, Muir’s men turned north and began their attack to capture the southern portion of Koblenz, secure the airport located there, and destroy the bridge leading to Koblenz’ industrial island.

While Muir’s battalion was making its crossing, the three battalions of the 347th pushed hard toward the east. On its way toward Dieblich, Third Battalion was caught by heavy machine gun fire coming from German positions in a schoolhouse. A flanking platoon eliminated the German resistance and the rest of the battalion marched toward Dieblicherberg.

During the battle for Dieblich, Third Battalion captured twenty prisoners. Sending their prisoners back to Company L, Company I set out in pursuit of the remainder of the Germans who had occupied Dieblich and who were now pulling out toward Koblenz.

At the same time Third Battalion was fighting for Dieblich and Dieblicherberg, First Battalion was having a field day as it stormed the steep slopes across from Winningen. By careful manipulation of his forces, Lieutenant Colonel Cobb was successful in capturing 154 prisoners, including several SS troopers.

As night began to fall, Cobb gave the order for his men to dig in for the night. “Dog tired, we heard Colonel Cobb refuse orders to ‘attack Rhens immediately’,” says Mooseker. “He said his men had not had any rest in twenty-four hours and to expect results from such men was foolhardy. That night among the trees, Larry Landgraff, our squad leader and friend was killed by friendly fire while he was checking his men in their holes. Automatically, I became the squad leader. We all liked Larry and his quiet manner. I then hated the Germans more than I had before.”

The Second Battalion, completing its crossing, moved south to secure the high ground in the vicinity Neiderfell and to eliminate the resistance in that village. LTC Bodner bypassed the town and first secured the high ground. At 0900, Bodner’s men located the German mortar position that had been causing such problems at the Winningen crossing and brought artillery fire on top of it. By 1200, the German resistance in Neiderfell was eliminated. En route to this objective the battalion had cut off a column of retreating Germans and captured a kitchen and supply train with a complement of twenty German soldiers. The horses that were drawing these wagons were immediately put in use carrying ammunition and supplies forward from the bridgehead on the river.

En route to Koblenz, Muir’s Second Battalion of the 345th made quick initial progress, but was slowed later when the lead assault company encountered a series of roadblocks which prevented the supporting tanks from moving forward. Frustrated, Muir moved ahead to try and rectify the problem. When he arrived, one of the men shouted, “There are enemy on the right flank!”

Muir recalls, “I shouted for my men to hold their fire and instructed the First Sergeant of Company D to talk to the Germans. The First Sergeant told them it was useless to fight further and called for their surrender. They answered with a hail of bullets and rushed our group on the right side of the road. Within a few minutes, six prisoners, including one SS officer, were taken, and two of the enemy were killed. No casualties were suffered by our group. Again the First Sergeant shouted in German of the Germans to surrender. At this time a group of sixteen lined up on the road in front of the tanks and had reached the right of our position when a trigger happy BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle) man cut loose, scattering the group of sixteen. For the third time the First Sergeant talked to them and after a few shouted commands to our group to hold their fire, the German group surrendered.”

When night fell, Muir’s battalion had still not managed to reach its objective of Koblenz. Issuing orders for a night attack, Muir hoped that he could still secure the Koblenz airport. The attack commenced at 1900, but was met with heavy fire from German positions.

“In the dark, it seemed that the entire German army had opened up,” says Muir. Through the hail of fire, B Co pressed the attack with tanks firing in support. Retaliating with artillery, mortars, and small arms fire, the Germans stopped the attackers. After bringing up additional tank support, B Co was able to advance 200 yards, but was once again stopped by heavy fire. This time, though, the exchange of fire resulted in the capture of several of the German defenders. Further advances by B Co were met with continued stiff resistance inflicting several casualties on the company. At 0030, Major Muir gave the order to stop the attack, but to be prepared to resume it just before daylight. It had taken B Co nearly five and-a-half hours to move only 500 yards.

At day’s end, Oberst Wagner’s men had little to show for their efforts against the 87th. Throughout the day, the grenadiers had been thrown into several counterattacks against the 87th’s forces, but these attacks did little to stop the Americans. The infantry battalions of Brenner’s 6th SS had still not arrived and what little force of SS troopers was available was either killed, captured, or withdrawing. Wagner’s requests for additional reinforcements were denied since the LXXXIX Corps had none to offer.

“We had to reckon with the fact that the enemy would further widen the bridgeheads and send in his tanks on [17 March],” wrote Wagner. “A breakthrough was very likely considering [our] lack of artillery and ammunition and since no antitank or assault guns were available.” Knowing that his position was untenable, Wagner deployed his forces throughout the night of 16/17 March in a manner to slow the 87th’s inevitable advance on the next day. Other forces then began heading toward Brey and Rhens where Wagner hoped his men could escape to the west bank of the Rhine.

When dawn broke on the morning of the 17th, Muir’s First Battalion of the 345th prepared to make a final assault in its effort to secure the southern portion of Koblenz. After clearing out small groups of German soldiers who had infiltrated into the battalion’s area during the night, cutting communication wire, Muir’s men began their attack. The Germans in the Koblenz garrison immediately offered stubborn resistance. One of the American tanks was struck by an antitank round and was forced to withdraw. Fearing the same fate, the other tanks pulled out of the battle area, taking much of the steam out of the GI’s attack.

With the support of a heavy concentration of mortar and artillery fire directed at the German positions, the attack began to gain some ground. At approximately 1200, A Co, commanded by Captain J.A. Boring entered the built up portion of Koblenz and began eliminating resistance in the city. C Company, under the leadership of Lieutenant John Davis, crossed the bridge to Koblenz’ industrial island and had it cleared by 1700. Due to faulty fuse igniters, the bridge to the island could not be blown. Muir’s men continued clearing the city until nightfall when orders were received to halt the attack.

The 347th’s plan for the 17th was to send First Battalion to seize the city of Rhens, Second Battalion to seize the high ground surrounding the farming village of Kreimer Kpf, and for Third Battalion to capture Waldesch and be prepared to continue its assault into the city of Brey.

With the exception of Second Battalion’s assault of the Kreimer farm village, the 347th’s advance was met with determined resistance from the Germans. Preceded by a massive concentration of artillery on Waldesch, Third Battalion’s assault made good initial progress, but was halted by heavy return fire from the men of the 276th and especially that of newly arrived assault guns from Brenner’s 6th SS. The Germans offered determined resistance throughout the morning, but by noon their strength faded and the GI’s began to gain the initiative. At one point during the fighting, several young SS troopers launched a small counterattack against the Americans. The effort was futile, however, and Third battalion tore the troopers apart.

Bypassing Waldesch, First Battalion advanced through the woods north of the town and, in spite of heavy resistance, pushed on to the high ground overlooking Rhens. Here the battalion’s advance was checked by heavy fire. Sitting on the Rhine River, Rhens was strategically important to the Germans. “Under these circumstances,” wrote Wagner, “we had to prevent by all means a breakthrough in the direction of Rhens and Brey, since these were the only ferries across the Rhine in the division sector. In the event of a breakthrough, it would have no longer been possible to cross the river.”

The combined resistance of the SS troopers and the 276th continued to deny repeated attempts secure the city. However, the might of the American attack wore away at the enemy who was now pinned against the Rhine. Realizing that further defense west of the Rhine was futile, LXXXIX Corps sent orders for its forces to break away from fighting and assume new positions on the east bank. The German movement across the Rhine was aided greatly in the late afternoon of the 17th by heavy river fog that masked their movements.

Brenner recalls, “On 17 March, in agreement with corps headquarters, I continued to hold our present line, employing [my] forces in order to prevent the enemy from reaching Boppard… Boppard remained under heavy artillery fire, which fell with particular force on the ferrying site and on the road between Boppard and Brey. Still, despite these great difficulties, the troops were able to carry out the crossing.”

Cobb’s First Battalion advanced rapidly in the afternoon into Rhens, but its advance was once again slowed by the enemy’s rear guard that stayed to buy time for the larger force to escape. Fierce fighting in the city continued well into the evening, but Rhens was secure at 2245.

Hoping to deny the enemy the opportunity to establish new positions and to capture the German bridgehead, First Battalion continued its assault throughout the night toward Brey. As they went, the Germans blocked the roads with felled trees and harassed the Americans with small army fire. The assault was successful, but not before the enemy had completed his crossing under the cover of heavy fog and darkness.

John C Schweitzer