Walton Harris Walker (December 3, 1889 �?? December 23, 1950) was an American army officer and the first commander of the U.S. Eighth Army during the Korean War.

Walker was born in Belton, Texas on December 3, 1889 and graduated from West Point in 1912. Sometime during this period, Walker earned the nickname, "Johnnie," for his favorite brand of Scotch, Johnnie Walker (and as a play on his name). As a lieutenant, he served in the Vera Cruz expedition under Brigadier General Frederick Funston. Patrolling on the U.S.-Mexican border in 1916, he developed a close friendship with Dwight Eisenhower.

During World War I, Walker fought in France with the 5th Infantry Division and won the Silver Star for gallantry in action.

In the inter-war period, Walker rotated through a variety of assignments, including service in China, Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and teaching duties in several posts, including West Point. The turning point in his career occurred in the mid-thirties, when he served as executive officer of an infantry brigade commanded by George Marshall, making a strongly favorable impression on the future Army Chief of Staff.

World War II

When hostilities broke out in Europe in 1939, Walker was executive of the War Plans division of the general staff, but when Marshall (now Chief of Staff) assigned George Patton to organize America's armored forces, Walker successfully lobbied his old boss for a post as one of Patton's subordinate commanders in this effort, gaining promotion to brigadier general in the process. Promoted major general in 1942, he commanded Third Armored Division and eventually XX Corps, taking the latter to England in early 1944 and leading it into combat in Normandy in July as part of Patton's Third Army.

Walker's XX Corps played a distinguished role in Patton's dash across France in August and early September, earning the sobriquet, "Ghost Corps," for the speed of its advance. During this time Walker won high praise from both Patton and Eisenhower for his drive and aggressiveness; he was frequently well forward, driving with reckless speed in his jeep, close to his leading tank columns, in the style of his mentor and - some say - idol, Patton. Walker's troops saw heavy fighting in France and Germany during the remainder of the war, especially at Metz, the Battle of the Bulge, and in the invasion of Germany. In the spring of 1945 XX Corps liberated Buchenwald concentration camp, then pushed south and east, eventually reaching Linz, Austria, by May, as the war ended, and Walker received his third star, making him a Lieutenant-General. By now Walker was considered one of the Army's finest tank commanders, perhaps second only to Patton himself, who lauded his subordinate as "my fightingest son-of-a-bitch."

Post-World War II

After the war Walker became commander of Fifth Army, headquartered in Chicago, but in 1948, he received the assignment for which he is largely known: commanding general of the Eighth Army, the American occupation force in Japan. This proved a challenging assignment from the start. Soon after Walker's arrival, the Eighth Army, which had deteriorated into a soft, minimally trained, under equipped constabulary during the occupation, was ordered by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, to restore itself to combat worthy condition.

It was a difficult task, not only because of shortages in manpower, equipment, and training areas in cramped and overcrowded Japan, but also because Walker had a difficult relationship with the imperious MacArthur, his immediate superior, and (especially) MacArthur's chief of staff, Major General Ned Almond. Neither MacArthur nor Almond had confidence in Walker. According to witnesses, Walker himself displayed a lack of self-confidence when briefing his commander. The reasons for this are unclear, but may have had to do with MacArthur's lofty, almost god-like status, in the after-glow of World War II, as a world famous general, as the conqueror of Japan, as well as his intellectual brilliance and massive ego. Whatever the reasons, Eighth Army made only limited progress in its training program, which would soon cost it dearly.

Korean War

Shortly after the North Korean invasion of South Korea, in June, 1950, the Eighth Army was ordered to intervene and drive the invaders back across the 38th parallel, the border between the two countries. With only four divisions, still lightly equipped, poorly trained, and insufficiently hardened, Walker began landing troops on the southeast side of the Korean peninsula in July. After his lead units, elements of the 24th Infantry Division (including the ill-fated Task Force Smith), were virtually destroyed in a few days of furious fighting between Osan and Taejon, Walker realized his assigned mission was impossible and went over to the defensive. Pushed steadily back towards the southeast by the North Korean advance, Walker's forces suffered heavy losses and for a time were unable to form a defensible front, even after bringing the 1st Cavalry and 25th Infantry Divisions into the fight.

Walker's situation was not helped by unrealistic demands from MacArthur, in Tokyo, not to retreat an inch. Attempting to obey, Walker gave a bombastic "not a step back" speech to his staff and subordinate commanders which did not go over well, and did not stop the North Koreans from pushing the Americans, and the ROK forces (the South Korean army, which had been badly cut up in the opening days of the invasion), back even further. Indeed, outside observers began to fear the Eighth Army would be driven into the sea, creating, "another Dunkirk," and causing tremendous damage to American prestige in what was believed to be a struggle between the communist East and non-communist West for world dominance.

However, as American and ROK forces retreated further east and south, they finally arrived at a defensible line: the Nakdong River. They could now take advantage of shortened supply routes and a relatively good road network to exploit the advantages of "interior lines." Walker was able to quickly shift his units from point to point, reinforcing weak spots, meeting, slowing down, and eventually stopping North Korean attacks before they could reinforce them. The Americans were greatly aided by decoded radio intercepts of enemy communications, giving them advance knowledge of where communist attacks would occur. Walker was also able to employ artillery and airpower to great effect for the first time.

American forces gradually solidified this defensive position, which formed a small corner on the southeast side of the Korean peninsula, and was dubbed the "Pusan Perimeter"(for its chief port and supply center). Walker now received some much needed reinforcements, including the Provisional Marine Brigade, which he skillfully used, along with the Army's 27th Infantry Regiment, as "fire brigades," especially reliable troops who specialized in counterattacking and wiping out enemy penetrations. For several weeks, fighting raged up and down the perimeter. Losses were heavy on both sides. The North Koreans almost broke through on several occasions but each time they were beaten back, sometimes by airpower, sometimes by artillery barrages, most often by the tenacity and fighting spirit of the soldiers and Marines in the foxholes.

Gradually as more reinforcements arrived, the balance of combat power tilted in Walker's favor. North Korean forces had suffered terribly and their supply lines were under constant aerial bombardment. Almost all of their T-34 tanks, which spearheaded the invasion, had been destroyed. Walker ordered local counter-attacks while planning for a large scale breakout. This occurred in conjunction with MacArthur's audaciously brilliant Inchon landing in September.

The strategic situation was now reversed; with MacArthur's amphibious flanking move, the North Koreans seemed trapped between his anvil at Inchon and Walker's hammer coming out of the Pusan Perimeter. But Walker's attack, a straight ahead, hell-for-leather dash northwest towards Inchon and Seoul, emphasized speed over maneuver. It made no attempt to encircle and destroy the North Koreans after punching through their lines. In fact, although thousands of prisoners were taken, many North Korean units successfully disengaged from the Americans, melting away into the interior of South Korea - where they would conduct a guerilla war for two years. Others escaped completely, marching at night, on foot, all the way back to North Korea, to fight another day.

At the time, however, this seemed unimportant. With the war apparently won, Walker's Eighth Army quickly moved north and, with the independent X Corps (commanded by Walker's nemesis, Almond) on its right, crossed the 38th parallel to occupy North Korea. Fighting tapered off to sporadic, sharp clashes with remnants of North Korean forces. By late October the Eighth was nearing the Yalu River, North Korea's border with China. Walker, informed by MacArthur's headquarters that the Chinese would not intervene, did not insure that his troops maintained watchful security. Indeed, there was a slack, "home by Christmas" attitude in many Army units. Also, due to a lack of coordination between Walker, Almond, and MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, a huge gap had opened between Eighth Army and X Corps as they moved close to the Chinese border. Finally, the weather had turned savagely cold, and most American units had no training and inadequate equipment for the bitter temperatures.

All this proved disastrous when the Chinese did, in fact, intervene. First in a series of ambushes, then in sporadic night attacks, finally in an all-out offensive, large Chinese forces infiltrated, in, around, and between American units, skillfully taking advantage of the American failure to take basic security measures, the large intervals between spread out American and South Korean units, and the 80 mile wide empty space between Eighth Army and X Corps. From late October until the beginning of December, the Chinese caused havoc, killing or capturing thousands of American and ROK soldiers, almost destroying the 2nd Infantry Division, and forcing Walker into a desperate retreat.

By early December, using his superior mobility (in trucks and other motor vehicles), Walker had successfully broken contact with the Chinese (who had virtually no motorized transport), withdrawing south to a position around Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. Asking for but receiving no instructions on what to do next from MacArthur's headquarters, Walker decided that Eighth Army was too battered in body and spirit to defend Pyongyang, and ordered the retreat resumed to below the 38th parallel. Vast amounts of supplies which had been accumulated in the capital were ordered destroyed, and as freezing, dejected, exhausted US and Korean troops passed through the city they were treated to the spectacle of these supplies going up in huge bonfires.

Death

Once again, the Eighth Army succeeded in escaping south, but it had still not found a line it could defend when Walker, riding at high speed in his command jeep to inspect positions north of Seoul on December 23, 1950, was killed when he collided with a civilian truck. His body was escorted back to the United States by his son, Sam S. Walker, who himself would become a general. South Korea subsequently honored Walker by naming a hill in the southern part of Seoul in his honor. "Walker Hill" is now the site of one of the older fine hotels in Seoul, the Walker Hill Sheraton. He was buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

Honors and assessment

Promoted posthumously to full general, Walker's memory was much honored in the years immediately following the Korean War. The Army chose his name (and his other nickname), for its next light tank, the M41 Walker Bulldog. Dallas, Texas, named the western segment of Texas State Highway Loop 12 after him (the portion going through neighboring Irving, Texas continues the naming convention). One of the largest Armed Forces Recreation Center's hotels, the General Walker Hotel in Berchtesgaden (now demolished), was also named in his honor.

Walker's reputation as a general, high after World War II, was diminished by his record in Korea. But in making an assessment, it is important to remember several things:

1. Few generals have ever been given a more daunting task than the one handed Walker in July 1950. He had to lead - against a ruthless, tough, well-trained and well-equipped foe - an army that was none of these things, that was, in fact, one of the worst ever fielded by the United States. Part of its unfitness was Walker's fault, but only part.

2. The support and confidence Walker, as commander of the Eighth Army, should have received from his superiors was often lacking. Again, it was partly his fault; his lack of self-confidence in front of MacArthur, his inability to inspire his subordinates and (in notable contrast to World War II) his commander, were serious shortcomings. Still, MacArthur was a very difficult man to serve under, and even before his clash with President Truman, MacArthur's own behavior and performance during the Korean War - despite flashes of genius like Inchon - is open to severe criticism.

3. Finally, there is still no biography, "definitive" or otherwise, on Walton Walker, except for short write-ups in books about the Korean War itself. This is a pity, for as important as he was, if only because of being in a critical position at a critical time, he deserves a full biography, and it would be useful to students of history as well as students of the military art, to know more about the man, about his strengths and weaknesses.

Having entered these caveats, it is generally thought that Walker, while unquestionably brave and a competent commander of troops, was not an inspiring or gifted leader of men. Often overweight, with a protuberant stomach, and blustery manner; he was also shy and (some fellow officers believed) insecure about his relatively short stature (5'5") and generally unimpressive appearance. Although a "hard-charger" in Europe in '44 and '45, he had seemingly slowed down by the time he took command of the Eighth Army.

Walker never had a high reputation as a tactician or for brainpower. His breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, while slashing in the Patton mold, ignored the differing realities on the ground, rejected maneuver in favor of showy advance, and allowed thousands of North Korean soldiers to escape to fight another day. Under his care, or lack of it, the Eighth Army, which had been forced to harden or die in Pusan, gradually lost its edge the farther it advanced north after the breakout, until it was again careless and slack, and easy pickings for Chinese infantry in the terribly harsh conditions along the Chongchon River in North Korea.

Nevertheless, Walker's leadership during the dark days of July and August, 1950, redeems him from his earlier and later failures. For this was the most critical time of all in the Korean War, when the United States came closest to a true catastrophe. Constantly on the move, close to the fighting, visiting divisions and regiments, hectoring their commanders to stand firm, moving units to protect the most threatened areas, Walker's defense of the Pusan Perimeter was a historic achievement, which prevented the loss of the war by the United States before it had hardly begun.

Walker, Walton Harris (Johnnie), GEN